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Abstract
In multi-agent systems, an individual agent can pursue its
own goals, which may conflict with those hold by other
agents. To settle on a common goal for the group of agents,
the argumentation/dialogue game provides a robust and flex-
ible tool where an agent can send its explanation for its goal
in order to convince other agents. In the setting that the num-
ber of agents is greater than two and they are equally trustful,
it is not clear how to extend existing argumentation/dialogue
frameworks to tackle conflicts from many agents. We pro-
pose to use the defeasible logic to model the n-person argu-
mentation game and to use the majority rule as an additional
preference mechanism to tackle conflicts between arguments
from individual agents.
Introduction
In a group of agents, there are several situations requir-
ing agents to settle on a common goal despite that each
agent can pursue its goals which may conflict with other
agents. A simple but efficient method to tackle the prob-
lem is to give weights over the goals. However, this
method is not robust and limits the autonomy of an indi-
vidual agent. Also, the conflicts among agents are likely
to arise from a partial view and incomplete information on
working environment of individual agents. To settle con-
flicts among agents an agent can argue to convince others
about its pursued goal and provides evidences to defend
its claim. This interaction between agents can be mod-
elled as an argumentation game (Prakken & Sartor 1996;
Jennings et al. 1998; Parsons & McBurney 2003; Am-
goud, Dimopoulos, & Moraitis 2007). In an argumentation
game, an agent can propose an explanation for its pursued
goal (i.e., an argument), which can be rejected by counter-
evidences from other agents. This interaction can be iterated
until an agent (the winner) successfully argues its proposal
against other agents. The argumentation game approach of-
fers a robust and flexible tool for agents to resolve conflicts
by evaluating the status of arguments. Dung’s argumentation
semantics (Dung 1995) is widely recognised to establish re-
lationships among arguments. The key notion for a set of
arguments is whether a set of arguments is self-consistent
and provides the base to derive a conclusion. A conclusion
is justified, and thus provable, if there is a set of supporting
arguments and all counter-arguments are deficient when we
consider the arguments in the set of supporting arguments.
An argumentation game is more complicated when the
number of participants is greater than two. It is not clear how
to extend existing approaches to cover the argumentation in
groups of more than two agents, especially when agents are
equally trustful. That is arguments from individual agents
have the same weight. In this case, the problem amounts to
how to decide which argument has precedence over compet-
itive arguments. In other words, the problem is to determine
the global collective preference of a group of agents.
The main idea behind our approach is that if individual
preferences of agents are not sufficient to solve a conflict
(for example, we have several arguments without any rel-
ative preference over them), the group of agents uses the
majority rule (Lin 1996) over initial proposals to determine
the “most common” claim known as the “topic” of a dia-
logue. That is the topic preferred by the majority of the
group. An agent either supports the topic or defends its own
claim against the topic. Our majority mechanism simplifies
the complexity of the n-person argumentation and provides
a strategy for an agent to select an argument for defending
its proposal. That is an argument causing more “supporters”
to reconsider “their attitude” will be preferred by defending
agents.
Each of our agents has three types of knowledge: its
private knowledge, background knowledge, and knowledge
obtained from other agents. The background knowledge
presents the expected behaviour of a member of the group
that is commonly shared by the group. The knowledge
about other agents growing during the interactions enables
an agent to efficiently convince others about its own goal.
Essentially, the background knowledge is preferred over
other sources because it represents common expectations
and constraints of the group. Any argument violating the
background knowledge is not supported by the group.
Defeasible logic is chosen as our underlying logic for the
argumentation game due to its efficiency, simplicity in rep-
resenting incomplete and conflicting information and rela-
tionships with logic programming (Antoniou et al. 2006).
Furthermore, the logic has a powerful and flexible reasoning
mechanism (Antoniou et al. 2000; Maher et al. 2001) which
enables our agents to capture Dung’s argumentation seman-
tics by using two features of defeasible reasoning, namely
the ambiguity propagating (the preference over conflicts is
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unknown) and ambiguity blocking (the preference is given).
Our paper is structured as follows. In the second sec-
tion, we briefly introduce essential notions of defeasible log-
ics, the construction of arguments using defeasible reason-
ing with respect to (w.r.t) ambiguous information, and the
majority rule. In the third section, we introduce n-person ar-
gumentation framework using defeasible logic. We present
firstly the external model of agents’ interaction, which de-
scribes a basic procedure for an interaction between agents.
Secondly, we define the internal model, which shows how an
agent can deal with different individual knowledge sources
in order to propose and to defend its goal against the other
agents. The fourth section provides an overview of research
works related to our approach. The final section concludes
the paper.
Background
Defeasible Logic
Following the presentation in (Billington 1993), the basic
components of defeasible logic (DL) are: facts, strict rules,
defeasible rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation.
Facts are undeniable statements, which are always true.
Strict rules, similar to rules in classical logics, are rules
whose conclusions are unquestionable. Defeasible rules are
different from strict rules in the way that their conclusions
can be overridden by contrary evidences. Defeaters are rules
that cannot be used to draw any conclusion but to prevent
some conclusions from some defeasible rules by producing
evidence to the contrary. The superiority relation defines
priorities among rules. That is, one rule may override the
conclusion of another rule when we have to solve a conflict
between rules with opposite conclusions.
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a
finite set of facts, R a finite set of rules, and > a superiority
relation on R.
The language of DL consists of a finite set of literals.
Given a literal l, we use ∼l to denote the propositional lit-
eral complementary to l, that is if l = p, then ∼l = ¬p, and
if l = ¬p, than ∼l = p.
A rule r in R is composed of an antecedent or body A(r)
and a consequent or head C(r). A(r) consists of a finite set
of literals while C(r) contains a single literal. A(r) can be
omitted from the rule if it is empty. The set of rules R can
include all three types of rules, namely Rs (strict rules), Rd
(defeasible rules), and Rd f t (defeaters). We will use Rsd for
the set of strict and defeasible rules, and R[q] for the set of
rules whose head is q.
A conclusion derived from the theory D is a tagged literal
and is categorised according to how the conclusion can be
proved:
• +∆q: q is definitely provable in D
• −∆q: q is definitely unprovable in D.
• +∂q: q is defeasibly provable in D.
• −∂q: q is defeasibly unprovable in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or
proof) in D= (F,R,>). Informally, definite conclusions can
derive from strict rules by forward chaining, while defeasi-
ble conclusions can obtain from defeasible rules iff all pos-
sible “attacks” are rebutted due to the superiority relation or
defeater rules.
A derivation is a finite sequence P = (P(1), . . . ,P(n))
of tagged literals satisfying proof conditions (which corre-
spond to inference rules for each of the four kinds of con-
clusions). P(1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P
of length i. In the follows, we present the proof for definitely
and defeasibly provable conclusions1:
+∆: If P(i+1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P(1..i)
+∂ : If P(i+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ Rsd [∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] such that t > s and
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i)
The set of conclusions of a defeasible theory is finite2, and
it can be computed in linear time (Maher 2001). In addition,
several efficient implementations have been proposed (see
(Maher et al. 2001)).
Example 1 Consider the defeasible theory D has a set of
defeasible rules:
Rd = {r1 :⇒ a;r2 :⇒∼a;r3 :⇒ b;r4 : a⇒∼b}
and a superiority relation
>= {r2 > r1}
r1 and r2 have empty therefore they are applicable to derive
+∂a and +∂∼a respectively. These conclusions are clearly
ambiguous. Thanks to the superiority relation, the conclu-
sion of a is overridden. That means −∂a is in the conclu-
sions from theory D. As a result, +∂b is added to the con-
clusion set without any ambiguity. r4 is no longer applicable
due to −∂a.
Defeasible logic can be extended by an ambiguity prop-
agating variant (See (Governatori et al. 2004; Antoniou et
al. 2000)). The superiority relation is not considered in the
inference process. The inference with the ambiguity propa-
gation introduces a new tag Σ. A literal p (+Σp) means p is
supported by the defeasible theory and there is a monotonic
chain of reasoning that would lead us to conclude p in the ab-
sence of conflicts. A literal that is defeasibly provable (+∂ )
is supported, but a literal may be supported even though it
is not defeasibly provable. Thus support is a weaker notion
than defeasible provability.
1 Refer to (Antoniou et al. 2001) for proof conditions for all
tagged conclusions.
2It is the Herbrand base that can be built from the literal occur-
ring in the rules and the facts of the theory
+Σ: −Σ :
If P(i+1) = +Σq then If P(i+1) =−Σq then
∃r ∈ Rsd [q]: ∀r ∈ Rsd [q]:
∀a ∈ A(r) : +Σa ∈ P(1..i) ∃a ∈ A(r) :−Σa ∈ P(1..i)
We can achieve ambiguity propagation behaviour by making
a minor change to the inference condition for +∂AP3
+∂AP: If P(i+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂APa ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ Rsd [∼q]
∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂APa ∈ P(1..i) or
Example 2 We modify the defeasible theory D in example
1 by removing the superiority relation:
Rd = {r1 :⇒ a;r2 :⇒∼a;r3 :⇒ b;r4 : a⇒∼b}
Without the superiority relationship, there is no means to
decide between a and ∼a due to both of r1 and r2 are ap-
plicable. In a setting where the ambiguity is blocked, b is
not ambiguous because r3 for b is applicable whilst r4 is
not since its antecedent is not provable. If the ambiguity is
propagated, we have evidence supporting all of four literals
since all of the rules is applicable. +Σa,+Σ∼a,+Σb and
+Σ∼b are included in the conclusion set. Moreover we can
derive −∂a, −∂∼a, −∂b and −∂∼b showing that the re-
sulting logic exhibits an ambiguity propagating behaviour.
In the second setting b is ambiguous, and its ambiguity de-
pends on that of a.
Argumentation by Defeasible Logic
In what follows, we briefly introduce the basic notions of an
argumentation system using defeasible logic as underlying
logical language. Moreover, we present the acceptance of
an argument w.r.t Dung’s semantics.
Definition 1 An argument A for a literal p based on a set
of rules R is a (possibly infinite) tree with nodes labelled by
literals such that the root is labelled by p and for every node
with label h:
1. If b1, . . . ,bn label the children of h then there is a rule in
R with body b1, . . . ,bn and head h.
2. If this rule is a defeater then h is the root of the argument.
3. The arcs in a proof tree are labelled by the rules used to
obtain them.
In general, arguments are defined to be proof trees (or
monotonic derivations). Defeasible logic requires a more
general notion of proof tree that admits infinite trees, there-
fore the distinction is kept between an unrefuted, but infi-
nite, chain of reasoning and a refuted chain. Depending on
the rules used, there are different types of arguments.
• A supportive argument is a finite argument in which no
defeater is used.
3The proof for −∂AP is derived from that of +∂AP using the
strong negation principle (Maher et al. 2001).
• A strict argument is an argument in which only strict rules
are used.
• An argument that is not strict, is called defeasible
Relationships between two arguments, A and B, are de-
termined by those of literals which are constituted in these
arguments. An argument A attacks a defeasible argument B
if a conclusion of A is the complement of a conclusion of B,
and that conclusion of B is not part of a strict sub-argument
of B. A set of argumentsS attacks a defeasible argument B
if there is an argument A inS that attacks B.
A defeasible argument A is undercut by a set of arguments
S ifS supports an argument B attacking a proper non-strict
sub-argument of A. An argument A is undercut byS means
we can show that some premises of A cannot be proved if
we accept the arguments inS .
It is noticed that the concepts of the attack and undercut
concern only defeasible arguments and sub-arguments. For
strict arguments we stipulate that they cannot be undercut or
attacked.
A defeasible argument is assessed as valid if we can show
that the premises of all arguments attacking it cannot be
proved from the valid arguments in S . The concepts of
provability depend on the methods used by the reasoning
mechanism to tackle ambiguous information. According to
the features of the defeasible reasoning, we have two defini-
tions of acceptable arguments (definition 2 and 3).
Definition 2 In case of the reasoning with the ambiguity
propagation, an argument A for p is acceptable w.r.t a set
of argumentsS if A is finite, and
1. A is strict, or
2. every argument attacking A is attacked byS .
Definition 3 If the reasoning with the ambiguity blocking is
used, an argument A for p is acceptable w.r.t a set of argu-
mentsS if A is finite, and
1. A is strict, or
2. every argument attacking A is undercut byS .
Due to the concept of acceptance, we can determine the
status of an argument. If an argument can resist a reasonable
refutation, this argument is justified (definition 4). If an ar-
gument can not overcome attacks from other arguments, this
argument is rejected (definition 5).
Definition 4 Let D be a defeasible theory. We define JDi as
follows.
• JD0 = /0
• JDi+1 = {a ∈ ArgsD| a is acceptable w.r.t JDi }
The set of justified arguments in a defeasible theory D is
JArgsD =
⋃∞
i=1 J
D
i .
Definition 5 Let D be a defeasible theory and T be a set of
arguments. We define RDi (T ) as follows.
• RD0 (T ) = /0
• RDi+1(T ) = {a ∈ ArgsD| a is rejected by RDi (T ) and T }.
The set of rejected arguments in a defeasible theory D w.r.t.
T is RArgsD(T ) =
⋃∞
i=1 R
D
i (T ).
Majority Rule
The majority rule from (Lin 1996) retrieves a maximal
amount of consistent knowledge from a set of agents’ knowl-
edge. Conflicts between agents can be tackled by consider-
ing not only the number of agents supporting that informa-
tion but also the importance (reliability) of the agents. The
approach provides a useful and efficient method to discover
information largely held by agents. The majority knowl-
edge can be used either to reinforce the current knowledge
of an agent or to introduce new information into the agent’s
knowledge.
Due to possible conflicting information within a source,
the merging operator by majority cannot directly apply to
our framework. Instead, the majority rule pools potential
joint conclusions derived by the defeasible reasoning, which
resolves possible conflicts.
Considering the knowledge sources {T1, . . . ,Tn}, Ci de-
notes the set of tagged conclusions that can be derived by
the defeasible reasoning from the corresponding theory Ti.
The level that the theory Ti supports a literal l corresponds
to its weight represented wTi as follows:
support(l,Ti) =
{
wTi l ∈Ci
0 otherwise
The majority knowledge from the others, Tmaj, whose ele-
ments are inferred from {C1, . . . ,Cn} by the majority rule, is
determined by the formula:
Tmaj =
{
c :∑
Ti
support(c,Ti)>
∑wTi
2
}
n-Person Argumentation Framework
In this section, we develop our framework by using the ar-
gument construction from the defeasible reasoning. In par-
ticular, we define an external model which describes inter-
actions between agents in order to achieve a goal supported
by the majority. Also, we present an internal model which
illustrates the reasoning method on knowledge from other
agents exposed during interactions.
Model Agents’ Interaction
This section describes the basic scenario where an individual
agent exchanges arguments to promote its own goal and to
reach an agreement by the majority. Consider a set of agents
A sharing a set of goals G and external constraints repre-
sented as a defeasible theory Tbg. These external constraints
are also known as background knowledge which provides
common expectations and restrictions among agents in A .
An individual agent inA can have its own view on the work-
ing environment, therefore can pursue its own goals. In this
work, we model the interactions among these agents in or-
der to establish a goal accepted by the majority of the group.
Due to the partial view and incomplete information of an
agent, we believe the argumentation game is a useful method
to tackle this problem.
Determine common goal. In order to pursue a goal, an
agent generates an argument for its goal. This goal is con-
sidered as its main claim. The process to determine the goal
supported by the group involves multiple steps in a dialogue
as follows.
1. Each agent broadcasts an argument for its goal. The sys-
tem can be viewed as an argumentation game with n play-
ers corresponding to the number of agents.
2. The group of agents determines the dialogue topic by us-
ing the majority rule over the set of claims (i.e. the goals
from players)4. The claim supported by more than a half
of the group is selected. If the group can not settle a topic,
the previous step is repeated. The dialogue terminates
early if agents fail to achieve a majority goal and they
do not have any new goal to propose.
3. An agent can rest if its claim is supported by the major-
ity. Otherwise, the agent can provide a new argument to
defend its claim against the common one. At this step,
the group creates a set of majority arguments Argsma ji and
a set of majority premises Pma ji where i indicates the it-
eration. An agent utilises these sets to select its new ar-
guments for subsequence steps. Also, new arguments are
required to be justified by the background knowledge.
4. A dialogue terminates when all agents pass for an iteration
(i.e., do not propose a new argument). Now, the group can
settle on the common goal and the explanation accepted
by the majority of the group.
Example 3 Suppose that there is three agents A1, A2, and
A3. A1 and A2 respectively propose ArgsA1 and ArgsA2
ArgsA1 ={⇒ e⇒ b⇒ a}
ArgsA2 ={⇒ e⇒ c⇒ a}
whilst A3 claims
ArgsA3 = {⇒ d⇒∼a}.
The topic of the dialogue accepted by the majority is a.
Identify majority arguments. Once the group success-
fully identifies the common claim, the group is divided
into two sub-groups namely “pros-group” and “cons-group”.
Agents in the pros-group support the common claim whilst
the cons-group does not. By using the majority rule the
agents in the cons-group determine their defensive argu-
ments by attacking the “most common” premise among the
arguments from the pros-group. That will force the pros-
group to reconsider their claim.
At iteration i, Gma ji is the claim by the majority of active
agents (the agents broadcast their arguments). Argsma ji rep-
resents the set of majority arguments which are played by
the agents to support Gma ji .
Argsma ji =
|A |⋃
j=0
ArgsA j |ArgsA j ` Gma j
4Note that agents inA have the same weight, therefore the ma-
jority rule is applied knowledge sources such that each source has
the weight of 1.
where ArgsA j is the argument played by agent A j. The set of
majority premises at iteration i is
Pma ji = {p|p ∈ Argsma ji }
We define the preference over Pma ji as given p1, p2 ∈ Pma ji ,
p2  p1 if the frequency of p1 in Argsma ji is less than that of
p2.
Let i = 0 be the first iteration that agents in the group
reach a common claim. The topic of the dialogue is set to
Gma j0 . Given two consecutive iterations: i and i+ 1, G
ma j
i
and Gma ji+1 are incompatible claims. That is the pros-group
for Gma ji at iteration i is attacked by the cons-group which
gives Gma ji+1 in the next iteration as the counter-evidence.
In the case that the cons-group does not have an argument
which directly attacks Gma ji , the cons-group uses the order
of premises in Pma ji as a preference mechanism to select a
counter-argument. The idea is that Pma ji eventually contains
premises which are sub-claims of Gma ji . The higher order a
premises p in Pma ji has, the more agents in the pros-group
support p. Consequently, if p is rebutted, the pros-group
should revise its attitude towards the claim.
Example 4 Reconsidering example 3, we have
Gma j0 = a
Argsma j0 = {⇒ e⇒ b⇒ a;⇒ e⇒ c⇒ a}
Pma j0 = {a2,b1,c1,e2}
The superscript of a premise in Pma j0 represents its fre-
quency in Argsma j0 . Since the main claim of A3 does not pass
the majority selection, A3 can defend its proposal by attack-
ing either b or c or e in the next step. An argument against e
is likely to be a better selection compared with those against
b or c. Another alternative is that A3 proposes a new argu-
ment for ∼a stronger than any of the arguments played by
A1 and A2
Model Agent’s Internal Knowledge
The motivation, which drives an agent to participate in the
dialogue, is to promote its own goal. However, its argument
for the goal will be accepted if the argument is shared by the
majority of the group. To gain the acceptance of the major-
ity, the agent should consider common constraints and ex-
pectations of the group, governed by the background knowl-
edge, as well as the attitude of other agents when proposing a
claim. The majority rule over the knowledge obtained from
other agents enables an agent to probe a common attitude
among agents.
At the beginning of the dialogue, the majority rule de-
termines the main claim. In the follow iteration, this rule
identifies sub-claims to help an agent to effectively defend
its original claim. The idea is that an agent should launch an
argument which is likely to alter the majority opinion. The
majority rule provides a preference that is among the sup-
portive arguments for the main claim, identifying the most
common premise if an agent refutes this premise.
Knowledge representation. An agent, Ame, has three
types of knowledge including the background knowledge
Tbg, its own knowledge about working environment Tme, and
the knowledge about others:
Tother = {Tj : 1≤ j ≤ |A |& j 6= me}
Tj is obtained from agent Agj ∈A during iterations (propos-
ing arguments for individual goals). All of these knowledge
is represented in defeasible logic. Tj ∈ Tother is constructed
from an argument Ar proposed by the agent Ag j. At iter-
ation i, the theory obtained from Ag j is accumulated from
previous steps T ji =
⋃i
k=0 T
j
k .
In our framework, agents can have conflicting knowledge
due to partial view and incomplete information sources. We
assume that the defeasible theories contain only defeasible
rules and defeasible facts (rules with empty body). There-
fore, the knowledge of an agent can be rebutted by that from
other agents.
Knowledge Integration. To generate an argument, an
agent should ponder knowledge from multiple sources. In
this section, we present two simple methods to integrate
knowledge sources based on ambiguity blocking and am-
biguity propagation: given two sources of knowledge, if the
preference between these two sources is known we can per-
form the ambiguity blocking integration; Otherwise, we can
select ambiguity propagation integration.
Ambiguity blocking integration. This integration ex-
tends the standard defeasible reasoning by creating a new
superiority relation from that of the knowledge sources i.e.
given two knowledge sources as Tsp – the superior theory,
and Tin – the inferior theory we generate a new superiority
relation Rspd >R
in
d based on rules from two sources. The inte-
gration of the two sources denotes as TINT = Tsp B Tin. Now
the standard defeasible reasoning can be applied for TINT to
produce a set of arguments ArgsTspBTinAB .
Example 5 Given two defeasible theories
Tbg = {Rd = {r1 : e⇒ c;r2 : g, f ⇒∼c,r3 :⇒ e};
>= {r2 > r1}}
and
Tme = {Rd = {r1 :⇒ d;r2 : d⇒∼a;r3 :⇒ g}}
The integration produces Tbg B Tme =
{Rd = {rTbg1 : e⇒ c;r
Tbg
2 : g, f ⇒∼c,r
Tbg
3 :⇒ e;
rTme1 :⇒ d;rTme2 : d⇒∼a;rTme3 :⇒ g};
>= {rTbg2 > r
Tbg
1 }}
Ambiguity propagation integration. Given two knowl-
edge sources T1 and T2, the reasoning mechanism with am-
biguity propagation can directly apply to the combination
theory denoted as TINT = T1 + T2. There is no preference
between the two source of knowledge, therefore, there is no
method to solve the conflicts between the two sources. That
is the supportive and op-positive arguments for any premise
are removed from the final set of arguments. The set of ar-
guments obtained by this integration denotes as ArgsT1+T2AP .
Justification by background knowledge. Agent Ame gen-
erates the set of arguments for its goals by combining its
private knowledge Tme and the background knowledge Tbg.
The combination is denoted as T
′
me = Tbg B Tme and the set
of arguments is ArgsT
′
me . Due to the non-monotonic nature
of the underlying logics, the combination can produce argu-
ments being beyond those from individual knowledge. That
is the combination can produce arguments which are totally
new to the two sources. From Ame’s view, this can bring
more opportunities to fulfil its goals. However, Ame’s argu-
ments must be justified by the background knowledge Tbg.
In other words, Tbg governs essential behaviours (expecta-
tions) of the group. Any attack to Tbg is not supported by
members of A .
Agent Ame maintains the consistency with the background
knowledge Tbg by following procedure:
1. Create T
′
me = Tbg B Tme. The new defeasible theory is ob-
tained by replicating all rules from common constraints
Tbg into the internal knowledge Tme while maintaining the
superiority of rules in Tbg over that of Tme.
2. Use the ambiguity blocking feature to construct the set
of arguments Args
Tbg
AB from Tbg and the set of arguments
ArgsT
′
me
AB from T
′
me.
3. Remove any argument in ArgsT
′
me attacked by those in
ArgsTbg , obtaining the justified arguments by the back-
ground knowledge
JArgsT
′
me = {a∈ ArgsT ′me and a is not attacked by ArgsTbgAB }
Example 6 Given two defeasible theories, Tbg and Tme ,in
example 5. We have
ArgsTbg = {⇒ e;
⇒ e⇒ c}
ArgsTbgBTme = {⇒ e;
⇒ e⇒ c;
⇒ d;
⇒ g;
⇒ d⇒∼a}
In this example, there is not any attack between arguments
in ArgsTbg and ArgsTbgBTme . In other words, arguments from
ArgsTbgBTme are acceptable by those from ArgsTbg . The set of
justified argument w.r.t ArgsTbg
JArgsTbgBTme = ArgsTbgBTmee;
Pondering knowledge from the others. During the dia-
logue, an agent can exploit the knowledge that other agents
exposed in order to defend its main claims. Due to possible
conflicts in proposals from other agents, an agent can use the
sceptical semantics of the ambiguity propagation reasoning
in order to retrieve the consistent knowledge. That is given
competing arguments, the agent does not have any prefer-
ence over them and they will be rejected. The consistent
knowledge from the others allows an agent to discover “col-
lective wisdom” distributed among agents. From those ar-
guments, agent Ame should justify arguments against the set
of majority premises Pma ji at iteration i of the dialogue. The
judgement is done by using the arguments from the back-
ground knowledge ArgsTbg . The procedure runs as follows:
1. Create a new defeasible theory
T
′′
me = Tbg B Tme+Tother.
2. Generate the set of arguments ArgsT
′′
me
AP from T
′′
me using the
feature of ambiguity propagation.
3. Justify the new set of arguments
JArgsT
′′
me = {a|a ∈ ArgsT
′′
me
AP and a is accepted by Args
Tbg .
At iteration i of the dialogue, the group determines the set
Pma ji containing premises support by the majority. In or-
der to refute the majority claim, Ame can select an argument
from JArgsT
′
me
AB
⋃
JArgsT
′′
me
AP that attack a premise p ∈ Pma ji .
The preference of an argument against p is determined by
the weight of p. Since the weight of p is proportional to the
number of agents supporting p. If p is attacked, the majority
can change in favour to Ame.
Example 7 Suppose that
Tbg = {Rd = {r1 : e⇒ c;r2 : g, f ⇒∼c};>= {r2 > r1}}
and the private knowledge of Ame has
Tme = {Rd = {r1 :⇒ d;r2 : d⇒∼a;r3 :⇒ g}}
Agent Ame currently plays⇒ d⇒∼a and knows about other
agents
Tother = {T1,T2}
where
T1 = {⇒ e⇒ f ⇒ b⇒ a}
and
T2 = {⇒ e⇒ c⇒ a}
and at this step the majority premises
Pma ji = {a2,e2, f 1,b1,c1}.
The superscript of an element of Pim j represents the fre-
quency (weight) of this element.
The defeasible reasoning with ambiguity propagation for
the combination Tbg +Tme +Tother generates a set of argu-
ments⇒ g,⇒ e,⇒ e⇒ f ⇒ b,⇒ g, f ⇒∼c. ⇒ g, f ⇒∼c
is due to the superiority relation in Tbg. Given the current
knowledge of Ame this is only argument that Ame can play.
Related Work
Substantial work have been done on argumentation games
in the artificial intelligence and Law-field. (Prakken & Sar-
tor 1996) introduces a dialectical model of legal argument,
in the sense that arguments can be attacked with appropriate
counterarguments. In the model, the factual premises are not
arguable, they are treated as strict rules. (Lial 1998) presents
an early specification and implementation of an argumenta-
tion game based on the Toulmin argument-schema without
a specified underlying logic. (Lodder 2000) presented The
Pleadings Game as a normative formalization and fully im-
plemented computational model, using conditional entail-
ment. The goal of the model was to identify issues in the
argumentation rather than as in our case elaborating on the
status of the main claim.
Using the defeasible logic to capture concepts of the ar-
gumentation game is supported by (Letia & Vartic 2006;
Nilsson, Eriksson Lundstro¨m, & Hamfelt 2005) and recently
(Thakur et al. 2007; Eriksson Lundstro¨m et al. 2008). (Letia
& Vartic 2006) focuses on persuasive dialogues for cooper-
ative interactions among agents. It includes in the process
cognitive states of agents such as knowledge and beliefs,
and presents some protocols for some types of dialogues
(e.g. information seeking, explanation, persuasion). (Nils-
son, Eriksson Lundstro¨m, & Hamfelt 2005) provides an ex-
tension of defeasible logic to include the step of the adver-
sarial dialogue by defining a metaprogram for an alternative
computational algorithm for ambiguity propagating defeasi-
ble logic while the logic presented here is ambiguity block-
ing.
We tackle the problem of evolving knowledge of an agent
during iterations, where the argument construction is an ex-
tension of (Thakur et al. 2007; Eriksson Lundstro¨m et al.
2008). In our work, we define the notion of majority ac-
ceptance and a method to weight arguments. In (Thakur et
al. 2007), the strength of unchallenged rules is upgraded
over iterations. That is the conclusions supported by these
rules are not rebutted by the current iteration, these conclu-
sions are unarguable in follow iterations. The upgrade is
applied to all participants during iterations of the argumen-
tation game. (Eriksson Lundstro¨m et al. 2008) distinguishes
participants of the argumentation game. That is one partici-
pant must provide a strong argument (i.e. a definite proof) in
order to defeat arguments from other participants. Both of
the works do not directly handle the challenge coming from
multiple participants.
We extend the protocol of a argumentation game to set-
tle on a common goal. The termination condition of our
framework is either there is no more argument to rebut or
an agent can pass its proposal at one iteration. Settling on
a common goal among agents can be seen as a negotiation
process where agents exchange information to resolve con-
flicts or to obtain missing information. The work in (Am-
goud, Dimopoulos, & Moraitis 2007) provides a unified and
general formal framework for the argumentation-based ne-
gotiation dialogue between two agents for a set of offers.
The work provides a formal connection between the status
of a argument including accepted, rejected, and undecided
with possible actions of an agent (accept, reject, and nego-
tiate respectively). One important feature of the framework
is that this representation is independent with logical lan-
guages modelling knowledge of an agent. Moreover, an
agent’s knowledge is evolved by accumulating arguments
during interactions.
We have advantages of using the defeasible logic since it
provides us an elegant tool to naturally capture the above
statuses of arguments. Accepted, rejected, undecided condi-
tions can be simulated by the proof conditions of defeasible
reasoning w.r.t ambiguity of premises. If the preference over
knowledge sources is known, the accepted and rejected ar-
guments is corresponding to (+∂ ,−∂ ) using the feature of
ambiguity blocking. Otherwise, three conditions of argu-
ments are derived from (+∂ ,−∂ and +Σ). These notions
correspond to the existence of a positive proof, a negative
proof, and a positive support of a premise. In addition, de-
feasible logic provides a compact representation to accom-
modate new information from other agents.
From the perspective of coordination among agents, (Par-
sons & McBurney 2003) presents an argumentation based
communication, where agents can exchange arguments for
their goals and plans to achieve the goals. The acceptance
of an argument of an agent depends on the attitudes of
this agent namely credulous, cautious, and sceptical. Also,
(Rueda, Garcia, & Simari 2002) proposes a communica-
tion mechanism based on argumentation for collaborative
BDI agents, in which agents exchange their proposals and
counter-proposals in order to reach a mutual agreement.
During the course of conversations, an agent can retrieve
missing literals (regarded as sub-goals) or fulfil its goals by
requesting collaboration from other agents. However, these
works did not clearly show how an agent can tackle con-
flicts from multiple agents, especially when the preference
over exchanged arguments is unknown.
The main difference in our framework is the external
model where more than two agents can argue to settle on a
common goal. Since there is no preference over the proposal
of individual agents, the majority rule enables the group to
identify the majority preference over individual claims. On
one hand, we present the notion of the acceptance by the ma-
jority of agents. On the other hand, this notion relaxes the
complexity of n-persons argumentation game by partitioning
agents into two sub-groups: one supports the major claim;
the other opposes it. Moreover, the majority rule allows an
agent to probe the attitudes of the group in order to dynam-
ically create a preference over its defensive arguments if its
main claim is not accepted by the majority of agents. The
strategy to defend against the topic of the dialogue is to at-
tack the most common premise among the arguments sup-
porting the topic.
In our framework, an individual agent efficiently tackle
with conflicts from multiple sources of knowledge owing to
the use of the defeasible logic as the underlying logic. The
construction of arguments requires an individual agent to in-
tegrate the background knowledge commonly shared among
agents, knowledge from other agents, and its private knowl-
edge. The background knowledge has the priority over the
other sources, therefore when integrating any conflict with
this knowledge is blocked. Since all agents are equally trust-
ful, the knowledge from other agents has the same weight.
To achieve a consensus from knowledge of other agents and
to discover “collective wisdom”, the ambiguity propagation
is applied over all knowledge sources of an individual agent.
Conclusions
This paper has presented an n-person argumentation frame-
work based on the defeasible logic. In the framework,
we propose an external model based on the argumenta-
tion/dialogue game which enables agents in a group settle
on a common goal. An agent proposes its goal including
the explanation and argues with other agents about the goal.
At the termination, the group identifies a common goal ac-
cepted by the majority of the group and the supportive argu-
ment for the goal.
We also propose an internal model of an agent where an
individual agent can efficiently construct arguments from
multiple sources of knowledge including the background
knowledge presenting the common constraints and expecta-
tions of the group, knowledge from others which is evolved
during iterations, and its private knowledge. The back-
ground knowledge is preferred over the other sources of
knowledge. Due to the flexibility of defeasible logic in tack-
ling the ambiguous information, these types of knowledges
can be efficiently integrated with the private knowledge of
an agent (with or without a preference over the knowledge
sources) to generate and justify its arguments. The major-
ity rule relaxes the complexity of n-persons argumentation
dialogue game. This rule is used to identify the topic of
the dialogue among the claims of agents. That is the major-
ity acceptance of an argument. Also, an agent can use the
majority rule as a method to select an argument which chal-
lenges the major number of agents in order to better defend
its goal.
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